

# 统治者偏好、有限理性 与封建王朝周期性兴衰

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内容提要

关键词

## 一、文献综述与问题提出

1936

2001

2011

2004

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15BJL063

2016

2013

1993

## 二、制度变迁、制度效率与王朝兴衰





$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t} > 0 \quad \frac{\partial}{\partial} > 0$$

t



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## 五、结论与启示

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## The Preference and Limited Rationality of a Ruler and the Periodic Rise and Fall of a Dynasty

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**Abstract** The periodic rise and fall of a dynasty has become a hot issue in the field of new institutional economics and historical study in recent years. With the violent potential theory and Olsen North's origin of the state on the basis of the theory, through the analysis of theory and model, it can be concluded that the preference and limited rationality of a ruler play a decisive role in the institutional change. The rulers' preference and limited rationality make rulers give priority to their personal interests over social welfare while making decisions on institutional changes, which leads to low institutional efficiency. However, the institutional efficiency determines economic development as well as the periodic rise and fall of a dynasty.

**Keywords** institutional change; institutional efficiency; intergenerational preference; limited rationality; periodic rise and fall of a dynasty