

210095
210095



1.

A

2.

A
f

B

A

B

B

A

A

L₁

A

H₂

C₂

B

A

B

C₁

H₁

B

A

L₂

f

2

A

B

B

A

3.

A B

A

B


1

A

$U_{A1}=y$

M B
 $L_2+H_2 +f- C_2 > 0$
 $L_1+H_1 +f$ $L_2+H_2 +f$
 2 L
 H

$L_1+H_1 +f- C_1 > 0$
 M B



	1		
	2		
C			
	L_1+H_1	L_2+H_2	
	L_1+H_1	L_2+H_2	
		f	
		f	
		f	
	C_1	C_2	
	C_1	C_2	
			1 2

f

5.

()

1.

GDP

2.

3

	-C-S S	-C -P
	- f - 1- xf	- f- S -P+S- 1- xf

f C f
 1- xf P
 S
 3.

$$U_{L1} = -C + S - 1 - C$$

$$U_{L2} = -x f - 1 - f + S$$

1

$$U_L = x U_{L1} + (1-x) U_{L2} = x(-C + S - 1 - C) + (1-x)(-x f - 1 - f + S)$$

$$\frac{U_L}{x} = S + f - C$$

$$-f + -1 S \quad 0 \quad S + f - C \quad 0 \quad U_L \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad x=0$$

$$U_{E1} = S - 1 - 1 \times f \quad U_{E2} = P + 1 - [S - 1 - \times f]$$

$$U_E = yU_{E1} + (1-y)U_{E2}$$

$$= 2S + P - S y + (-1 - f - S + P + S)$$

$$\frac{U_E}{y} = 2S + P - S$$

$$U_{E1} = + - 1 - f - S$$

$$U_{E0} = + - 1 - f - S + P + S$$

$$S \quad P \quad U_{E1} \quad 0 \quad y=1$$

4.



C_2

R Q Q

$C_1 <$

P

F

5

3.

1. 2007 8
2. 2007 9
3. :
4. :
5. 2009 6
6. 2009 3
7. 2010 1
8. 2010 7
9. 2011 1

The Dynamic Equilibrium Analysis of Different Interest Groups Environmental Behavior

Qian Zhonghao Ren Huili

Abstract: Since environmental policy is implemented by local governments, environmental behaviors of local governments directly influence the whole country's environmental quality. In this paper we use game model to analyze the logic and the game process of different interest groups' environmental behavior, and conduct equilibrium solutions on games between local governments under the central government's accountability, games between environmental protection departments and local governments, and games between the public and the local government in turn. The central government emphasizes the local government accountability, increases the proportion of environmental protection index in the local government achievements appraisal system, and decrease the cost of local government performance of environmental responsibility, which can promote different local governments in the area to choose environmental protection strategy jointly; To change the dual leadership system of local environmental protection department, and to clear responsibility body and main body's responsibility, can effectively improve the environmental governance performance; Improving the public environmental protection consciousness, cultivating the society force of environmental protection, and making the social public become the main body of environmental supervision and accountability, can effectively promote the performance of government environmental responsibility.

Keywords: environmental behavior; dynamic equilibrium analysis; interest groups